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This  paper  investigates  the  institutional  factors  that  constrain  farmers’  incentives  to  enhance  the  quality
of cocoa  beans  in  Ghana.  Data  were  collected  at three  levels  of  aggregation  in the  cocoa  bean  value  chain:
village,  district,  and national  level.  Multi-stage  cluster  sampling  was  employed  to sample  120  farmers  and
12 purchasing  agents  of  licensed  buying  companies  from  12  villages  in  Assin  Foso,  Suhum,  Dormaa  and
Wasa Akropong  cocoa  districts.  Convenience  sampling  was  used  to  sample  key  informants  from  relevant
organizations  and  service  providers  at district  and  national  levels.  The  study  revealed  that,  even  though
quality  is  important  to all  categories  of  actors  in  the cocoa  sector,  interactions  among  them  are  hampered
by  problems  of  information  asymmetry  that  result  especially  in  farmers  evading  recommended  practices.
While  cocoa  sector  policies  ensure  the  export  of  premium  quality  cocoa,  policies  have  not  sufﬁciently
alleviated  the  information  problem  especially  in the  relation  between  farmers  and  cocoa  purchasing
agents.  It explains  why  Ghanaian  farms  have  not  been  able  to reach  their  full  potential  to produce  more
than  1,000,000  metric  tons  of  premium  quality  cocoa  annually.  Amongst  other  options,  self-selection
policies,  such  as  quality  testing  with  price  premiums,  are  recommended  for testing  as  potential  incentive
mechanisms  that address  information  asymmetry.
© 2012 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Sciences. Published by Elsevier B.V.
 All rights reserved.. Introduction
Cocoa beans exported from Ghana attract a substantial quality
remium compared with cocoa from other countries [1,2]. These
uality premiums partly explain the high revenue Ghana earns
rom cocoa, amounting to about 30% of Ghana’s total export rev-
nue and about 4% of GDP.1 Ghana’s status as a supplier of premium
uality cocoa is a result of strict post-production quality control
easures [3].  The volume of high-quality cocoa beans could be
ncreased if farmers could be motivated to enhance the quality of
arvested cocoa beans [4–7].The question is why cocoa farms in Ghana do not reach
heir full yield and quality potential. It is thought that insti-
utional factors restrain farmers’ incentives to enhance the
Abbreviations: COCOBOD, Ghana Cocoa Board; CoS-SIS, Convergence of Sciences
 Strengthening Innovation Systems; GDP, gross domestic product; LBC, licensed
uying company; PPRC, Producer Price Review Committee.
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ity,  P.O. Box 8130, NL-6700 EW Wageningen, The Netherlands.
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1 Bank of Ghana Annual Report, 2009.
573-5214/$ – see front matter ©  2012 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Scienc
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.njas.2012.06.009quality of the cocoa beans they produce [8].  The Convergence of
Sciences – Strengthening Innovation Systems (CoS-SIS) research
programme (see Introduction to this issue), of which this study
forms part, proposes to tackle the quality concern in Ghana’s cocoa
sector through experimenting with institutional change [9–13]. The
CoS-SIS approach involves identiﬁcation and facilitation of institu-
tional changes that might provide incentives for Ghanaian cocoa
farmers to enhance the quality of the cocoa beans they produce.
Quality cocoa here refers to cocoa that is well fermented, dried,
and free from disease, contamination and other physical defects.
Because the kinds of change that might achieve this quality
objective cannot be known in advance, industry stakeholders acting
together in a Concertation and Innovation Group (CIG) have been
convened to identify, develop and implement institutional exper-
iments to discover which options work best. In the cocoa domain,
the success or otherwise of the CoS-SIS approach will depend on
how thoroughly the issue of farmers’ incentives to enhance cocoa
bean quality is understood. This paper is based on a diagnostic study
of the institutional factors that have been identiﬁed as constrain-
ing farmers’ practices to enhance cocoa bean quality. Other studies
that analyse the cocoa sector of Ghana from an institutional point of
view do not pay much attention to the incentives to sustain quality
by cocoa farmers [14–18].
es. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Table 1
Districts and villages sampled in this study.
Ecological zone District Villages
Coastal savannah Assin Foso Nkranfuom Ayitey
Wurakesse
Deciduous rain forest Suhum Asuogya Duodukrom
Kuano
Rain forest Wassa Akropong Oppong Valley Bogoso
Donkor Krom
Transitional zone Dormaa Ahenkro Esikeso DiabaaW. Quarmine et al. / NJAS - Wageninge
The objective of this paper is to identify the institutional factors
hat act as a disincentive to farmers to enhance the quality of their
ocoa beans. Speciﬁcally, the paper addresses four questions: (1)
ow do the key actors in Ghana’s cocoa sector deﬁne quality? (2)
hat is the state of cocoa bean quality in Ghana? (3) What are the
nstitutional and socio-technical reasons underlying the cocoa bean
uality problem? (4) What institutional or policy options are likely
o address the quality problem in Ghana’s cocoa?
The study was based on two assumptions: (1) the quality of
ocoa beans produced and exported depends on the actions and
nteractions of all the actors in the cocoa sector and (2) institu-
ions shape the incentives for these actions and interactions [19].
nstitutions are “. . .the set of common habits, routines, established
ractices, rules or laws that regulate the relations and interac-
ions between individuals and groups” [20,21].  Actors in this study
efer mainly to those individuals or organizations involved with
he physical handling of cocoa beans from production to export.
hey include farmers, licensed buying companies (LBCs), which
uy cocoa beans from farmers on behalf of the third-party actor,
he Cocoa Board (COCOBOD). The latter is a parastatal entity that
overns the industry and also handles all cocoa bean exports.
. Methodology
.1. Study context
CoS-SIS selected the cocoa sector as one of its research domains
ecause of this sector’s importance to the national economy. Prob-
em identiﬁcation was carried out in three phases. First, a scoping
tudy was conducted that identiﬁed the main concerns in the cocoa
ector [8].  Second, stakeholder workshops were held throughout
he cocoa belt to identify and prioritize the possibly inadequate
ncentives for farmers to enhance quality. This paper relates to
he third phase, and reports the ﬁndings of a follow-up diagnostic
tudy of the prioritized problem. The analysis is conducted mainly
rom the perspective of the cocoa farmer. Such a perspective is
ppropriate since it is the farmers’ response to any institutional
mprovement that is likely to enhance the quantity and quality
erformance of the sector.
.2. Sampling procedures
The study was carried out in the cocoa districts of the southern
art of Ghana from June to September 2010. Data were collected
t three levels of aggregation: village, district, and national level.
ulti-stage cluster sampling was employed to select respondents
t the village and cocoa district levels. At the village level, data were
ollected from farmers and the purchasing clerks of the LBCs. At
he district level, data were obtained from the staff of the Quality
ontrol Company, the Cocoa Extension Co-ordinators of COCOBOD,
nd the District Ofﬁcers of the LBCs. Convenience sampling was
sed to select one key informant from each relevant organization
t the national level, including COCOBOD, cocoa processors, and
nput companies.
In order to select respondents from village and district levels, the
8 districts were clustered into four cocoa agro-ecological zones,
ased on the assumption that climatic factors affect cocoa bean
uality [22]. One cocoa district was selected randomly from each
one: Assin Foso from the coastal savannah zone, Suhum from the
eciduous rain forest zone, Wassa Akropong from the rain for-
st zone, and Dormaa Ahenkro from the transitional zone. Next,
imple random sampling techniques were used to select three
ocoa-growing villages from a list of villages in each of the four dis-
ricts. Nkranfuom, Ayitey, and Wura Kesse were selected from the
ssin Foso district; Anum Asuogya, Duodukrom, and Kuano fromNkrankwanta
Source: Field data 2010–2011.
the Suhum District; Nkrankwanta, Esikesu, and Diabaa from the
Dormaa Ahenkro District; and Bogoso, Donkor Krom, and Oppong
Valley from the Wassa Akropong District (Table 1).
A two-stage sampling procedure was  used to select farmers in
each village. In the ﬁrst round, ﬁve cocoa farmers were purpo-
sively selected in each village and invited to participate in focus
group discussions. They were selected on the basis of their general
knowledge of the sampled communities, and helped us to draw up
a tentative list of cocoa farmers in the village. In the second round
of sampling, 10 cocoa farmers were randomly selected from each
village using the tentative list as sampling frame, making a total
sample of 120 farmers. In addition, in each village further informa-
tion was  obtained from two  purchasing clerks of the LBCs and two
members of the government’s mass cocoa spraying gangs.
2.3. Data collection and analytical procedures
A semi-structured questionnaire was used to collect data from
the 120 farmers. A checklist was  used to guide the focus group dis-
cussions and key informant interviews with the institutional actors.
Further information was obtained from a desk review of ofﬁcial
documents supplied by COCOBOD. Descriptive statistics involv-
ing frequencies and percentages and content-analyses were used
to analyse the quantitative and qualitative data, respectively. The
quantitative data were analysed using SPSS (version 17, SPSS Inc.).
The socio-technical root system tool [23] was  used to analyse the
technical and institutional causes of poor cocoa bean quality. This
tool helped us ﬁrst to identify the central problem and then to pro-
vide biological or technical explanations for the problem, before
going on to unravel the institutional cause of the technical reasons
identiﬁed [23].
The ﬁndings from the diagnostic study were further validated
during meetings of the cocoa Concertation and Innovation Group
(CIG). Key ﬁndings were presented also at a meeting of the CIG
[October 2010] where participants were invited to make their input
into the study, attended by representatives from the Quality Control
Company, Ghana Standards Board, Cocoa Inputs Company, Kuapa
Kokoo (LBC), Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG), University
of Ghana, and the Ministry of Finance.
3. Results and analysis
3.1. Deﬁnition and perceptions of cocoa bean quality
The international cocoa market deﬁnes quality in four main
ways, as applied and certiﬁed in exporter–buyer contracts: (1)
physical quality; (2) bio-chemical quality; (3) process quality; and
(4) origin quality [24,25].3.1.1. Physical quality
Physical quality relates to moisture content, disease infesta-
tion, defectiveness of beans, mouldiness, and the presence of
foreign matter [26,27]. Both the domestic and the international
W.  Quarmine et al. / NJAS - Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences 60– 63 (2012) 7– 14 9
Table  2
Percentages of farmers who agree with the statement: “Bean quality is important for Ghana’s cocoa sector”.
Suhum (n = 30) Dormaa (n = 30) Assin Foso (n = 30) Wassa Akropong (n = 30) Total (n = 120)
Strongly disagree 10.0 3.3 10.0 0.0 5.8
Disagree 20.0 13.3 20.0 33.3 21.7
Neutral 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
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beans was  higher between 2002–2003 and 2007–2008, averaging
25% per annum. It is unclear what explains the very low percentage
of light crop and small beans for 2008–2009.Agree  10.0 46.7 
Strongly agree 60.0 33.3 
ource: Field data 2010–2011.
arket enforce physical quality standards because they are eas-
er to assess prior to export. COCOBOD sets and enforces minimum
hysical quality standards that are higher than the international
arket standards. These higher standards are imposed because
f the likelihood that the cocoa beans will deteriorate in tran-
it between farms and the ﬁnal market destination. By Ghanaian
tandards, a bag of cocoa beans is classiﬁed Grade I cocoa if the
eans are well fermented, have a moisture content not higher
han 7.5% and do not contain more than 3% beans with defects.
rade II cocoa is comparable to international premium quality
tandards that accept 4–8% beans with any of the other defects,
n addition to good fermentation, and not more than 8.5% mois-
ure content. Moreover, all cocoa bags must contain cocoa beans
f uniform size. While all other actors in Ghana’s cocoa sector
ave accepted the physical quality standards of the COCOBOD,
he farmers interviewed were generally unaware of these speciﬁc
equirements.
.1.2. Bio-chemical quality
Bio-chemical quality focuses on butter content, ﬂavour chem-
cals, heavy metals, toxic compounds, and the level of chemical
esidues left on the beans [28]. Ghana is known for the produc-
ion of cocoa beans of a high chemical quality. Recently, however,
oncerns have been raised about chemical residues on its beans.
n two occasions cocoa beans from Ghana have been rejected by
apanese and American markets because they exceeded maximum
hemical residue requirements. With the exception of COCOBOD,
he parameters of the chemical quality standards appear to be
nknown to most cocoa actors. Nevertheless, the key informant
nterviews revealed that COCOBOD itself acknowledges the impor-
ance of chemical quality and has taken steps to control chemical
sage in the cocoa sector. COCOBOD is also in the process of set-
ing up laboratories to test for the presence of chemical residues on
ocoa beans prior to export.
.1.3. Process quality
Biochemical quality refers to the production process of cocoa
.e., whether organic or inorganic methods are employed; whether
hild labour is used; and whether the production process and
ubsequent rewards beneﬁt the farmer and his community (fair
rade) [29]. The farmers and the LBCs interviewed did not con-
ider process quality an important component of cocoa bean
uality. However, COCOBOD is interested in maintaining Ghana’s
ood quality image on the international market and has taken
teps to include process-quality control into its policies. For
nstance, child labour on cocoa farms in Ghana has been mini-
ized. Some cocoa districts have been marked as organic cocoa
ones, while Kuapa Kokoo Ltd. has been certiﬁed as a fair trade
BC.
In general, the results from the interviews with farmers revealed
hat the majority of the respondents (71%) acknowledged the
mportance of cocoa bean quality to the development of the sec-
or (Table 2) and all of the LBC staff interviewed regarded cocoa
ean quality as being important to the sector. The perspective of
armers and LBCs is in line with COCOBOD’s vision to “Encourage0.0 26.7 23.3
0.0 40.0 48.3
and facilitate the production and processing of premium quality
cocoa.”2
3.2. State of cocoa bean quality in Ghana
Given the current area under production, cocoa farms have the
potential of producing up to 1,000,000 metric tons (MT) of premium
quality cocoa annually, yet actual production has not exceeded
750,000 MT  [30]. One explanation for this is that a great propor-
tion of the cocoa output suffers from diseases and poor handling
prior to purchasing by the LBCs, and are thus regarded as cocoa
waste [7].  National data on cocoa waste are available, but do not
provide accurate information on the total volume of cocoa going
waste on farms. This is because they capture only ofﬁcial cocoa
waste purchased by licensed buyers who do not extend their buying
activities to all cocoa-growing communities in Ghana. Yet, informa-
tion gathered from various editions of COCOBOD’s annual reports
suggests that cocoa waste as a percentage of annual production
has increased from about 1.5% in the 1999–2000 season to about
7% in the 2008–2009 season. Although these ﬁgures represent ofﬁ-
cial records of cocoa waste purchased in just a few communities,
there is no reason to expect that the ﬁgures will be very different
in other communities and they can be taken as a clear indication
that farmers could do more to increase the volume of quality cocoa
beans they sell.
The study found, based on key informant interviews with COCO-
BOD ofﬁcials and LBCs, that even the cocoa beans bought by the
LBCs sometimes fail COCOBOD’s strict quality control procedures
at district depots. Sometimes bags of cocoa beans fail quality tests
because the beans are not well dried, not of uniform size, or simply
defective. If the beans are not well dried, then LBCs are asked to dry
the beans to the appropriate moisture content. Defective, small, or
infested beans should either be thrown away or, if possible, sold to
licensed cocoa waste buyers.
It is reported for instance that in the 2004–2005 season, after six
weeks of purchases, only 15% of all cocoa purchased by the Produce
Buying Company (an LBC subsidiary of COCOBOD) met  minimum
quality standards [5]. In the 2005–2006 and 2006–2007 seasons,
less than 10% of the cocoa purchased by LBCs could meet interna-
tional premium quality standards because the percentage of cocoa
beans with a purple instead of chocolate colour was too high [31].
In Table 3, data from COCOBOD for the different categories of cocoa
beans purchased are given. Main crop cocoa beans are bigger in
size, whereas light crop and small beans are too small for export.
The table shows that over the last 10 years at least 10% of the total
volume of cocoa beans purchased from farmers annually was  too
small to be exported. The rejected beans are sold at a discount to
domestic manufacturers. The proportion of light crop and small2 Source: The mission statement of COCOBOD.
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Table  3
Proportion of light crop and small beans purchased in Ghana, 1999–2009.
Season Main crop Light crop Small beans
1999–2000 87.92 10.50 1.58
2000–2001 84.27 10.86 4.87
2001–2002 88.67 10.28 1.05
2002–2003 76.71 18.83 4.46
2003–2004 71.15 26.59 2.26
2004–2005 68.68 28.41 2.90
2005–2006 70.13 28.25 1.62
2006–2007 81.07 11.44 7.49
2007–2008 82.45 9.91 7.64
2008–2009 98.25 1.58 0.16
Source: COCOBOD, unpublished data.
Consequences 
Incr eased cost of 
quali ty cont rol 
Central  
prob lem 
Produ ctio n of  lo
unmarketa ble  co 
Biological 
causes  of the 
problem 
Poo r farming practices  
Choice  of  
planting 
material
Too lon g or 
too short  
pod storag e 
Bad pest and 
disease 
management 
Poor  
harve sti ng 
practices
Calendar- 
rather th an 
need-based  
spraying  
Irregular 
harvesting  
Instit ution al 
causes of  the 
prob lem 
Off -season financial 
shortages 
Inf
• Unf avourable  la nd use contracts   
• Produ cer  pric e policy (tim eli ness 
of price ann ounce ment)   
• Rent see king  beha viour  of  LBCs 
• High  co st of  lending 
• Theft  of  cocoa  bea ns 
• Lack of
• Lack  of 
grading
differen
farmgat
• We ak fa
organiz 
Inadequ a
Fig. 1. Biological and institutional causes of the sub-
Source:  Diagnostic Study, 2010/2011.nal of Life Sciences 60– 63 (2012) 7– 14
3.3. Main causes of the cocoa bean quality problem
Fig. 1 gives a diagrammatic representation of what we  think,
after analysing responses from interviews, are important technical
and institutional causes of the quality concerns mentioned in the
previous section.
3.3.1. Technical explanation of the quality problem
Our ﬁndings suggest that inappropriate pre- and post-harvestactivities are the main technical causes of the quality problem.
Table 4 presents the views of the sampled farmers on the practices
that result in cocoa beans that cannot be marketed. Even though the
choice of variety of cocoa planted affects the bio-chemical quality
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Table  4
Percentages of farmers who agree that the listed practices result in poor bean quality.
Farm practices Suhum (n = 30) Dormaa (n = 30) Assin Foso (n = 30) W.  Akropong (n = 30) Total (n = 120)
Variety type 6.7 13.3 6.7 0.0 6.7
Poor  farm sanitation 96.6 100.0 83.3 100.0 95.0
Type  of chemicals used 76.7 76.7 46.7 70.0 67.5
Frequency of harvest 96.6 96.6 76.7 86.7 89.2
Length  of pod storage 90.0 93.3 70.0 80.0 83.3
Poor  pod breaking 93.3 90.0 76.7 100.0 90.0
Poor  fermentation 83.3 90.0 76.7 86.7 84.2
Inadequate drying 60.0 66.7 90.0 70.0 71.7
Source: Field data 2010–2011.
Table 5
Percentages of farmers satisﬁed with selected components of COCOBOD’s price policy.
Price policy component Suhum (n = 30) Dormaa (n = 30) Assin Foso (n = 30) W.  Akropong (n = 30) Total (n = 120)
The price (amount) 60.0 83.3 13.3 70.0 61.6
General price increase 90.0 90.0 76.7 90.0 86.7
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32], only 7% of the farmers thought that the cocoa variety deter-
ines the ﬁnal quality of cocoa beans. Table 4 also shows that most
armers acknowledged the importance of farm maintenance (95%),
ppropriate harvesting (89%), good pod storage (83%), fermenta-
ion (84%), and drying (71%) in enhancing the quality of the cocoa
eans they produce. They explained, however, that carrying out all
he necessary farm practices requires extra costs in terms of time
nd inputs. It is not always possible for farmers to meet these costs
ecause they do not have an adequate incentive to do so.
.3.2. An information problem
The main reason why the incentive is inadequate appears to be
hat the domestic cocoa market suffers from a number of informa-
ion asymmetries. Farmers tend to have more knowledge than the
BCs and COCOBOD about the production and post-harvest prac-
ices they apply and hence about some aspects of the quality of their
ocoa beans prior to sale. At the same time, farmers lack informa-
ion about other important aspects of bean quality and required
tandards that is generated and shared at levels far above them in
he cocoa chain.
The asymmetries persist partly because the LBCs and COCOBOD
o not have effective mechanisms for monitoring the production
rocess of farmers. The high cost of monitoring each farmer’s activ-
ties could explain the absence of such procedures. The only time
armers’ practices are monitored is during the government’s mass
praying of cocoa farms, where the supervisors of spraying gangs
nsure that farmers have carried out their farm maintenance activ-
ties, such as weed removal and pruning the trees, before the cocoa
rees are sprayed against insects (capsids) and fungal disease (black
od).
Prior to the 1980s, when cocoa farmers were better organized,
he farmer organizations had rules for monitoring members’ prac-
ices. The collapse of the farmer organizations throughout the
ocoa growing communities arose from political interference, poor
rganization, and growing mistrust among farmers that increased
uring prolonged periods of political turbulence [35]. Though there
s an umbrella cocoa farmer organization, called the Ghana Cocoa
offee Sheanut Farmers Association, the association is active only
t national level.
Another explanation for the observed information asymmetry
s that in Ghana’s cocoa industry the cocoa beans are not graded
rior to purchase by the LBCs. It is only after the purchased cocoa
eans are bulked, sorted, and evacuated from the farms to district
epots that the strict quality control procedures of COCOBOD take16.7 10.0 17.5
60.0 80.0 62.5
effect. Meanwhile, because of high competition among the LBCs
for farmers’ beans, LBCs buy all the cocoa beans offered to them
by farmers and recondition them later through drying and sorting.
Farmers thus have a high incentive to reduce their production costs
by shirking some of the recommended practices.
3.3.3. A knowledge problem
From the analyses of the focus group discussions with farm-
ers it was observed that, apart from the information asymmetries
between farmers and the LBCs, farmers ﬁnd the linkage between
COCOBOD policies and cocoa bean quality hard to read. Farmers
have not received training and feedback on many aspects of qual-
ity control standards. The merger of the Cocoa Service Division of
COCOBOD, which formerly was in charge of the dissemination of
information, with the Agricultural Extension Department of the
Ministry of Food and Agriculture (that became known as the uniﬁed
extension system) marked the beginning of the collapse of special-
ized advisory services for cocoa farmers. Extension ofﬁcers under
the uniﬁed extension system are not sufﬁciently resourced to carry
out their information task with respect to this crop [36].
COCOBOD has recently partnered with private sector organiza-
tions like Cadbury Plc. to provide extension services to farmers.
It is too early to assess the impact on information asymmetries
and especially on farmers’ knowledge. However, there is a concern
that under this arrangement, the farmer: extension worker ratio
remains high. For example, at the time of this study, none of the
Cocoa Ofﬁces in the districts studied had more than seven exten-
sion agents. This is woefully inadequate, considering that each of
these districts had no less than 90 cocoa growing villages.
Most farmers interviewed were generally satisﬁed with COCO-
BOD’s price policy (Table 5). Apart from the amount paid per bag
of cocoa, the expectation of annual price increments gives the
farmers the assurance that their demands are being recognized
even though they were mostly not comfortable with the timing of
price announcements. Under their price policy, COCOBOD insures
farmers against world price volatility by selling cocoa in forward
markets. Windfalls are paid to farmers as bonuses. Farmers do not
perceive the current bonuses paid to them as in any way related to
the quality of their beans.3.3.4. An income problem
Notwithstanding the seemingly favourable price policy environ-
ment, farmers are faced with an income problem that sometimes
makes them reluctant to invest into quality-related activities. It
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s instructive to illustrate farmers’ income problems by way of a
umerical example. In line with the data from our survey and other
ational estimates, suppose an annual output of 250 kg beans per
ectare and an annual labour requirement of 80 working days per
ectare [14,33,34].  Also suppose that, again in agreement with what
e found, about 40% of the labour requirement is hired at the cost
f US$ 3.57 per day, 10% comes from non-paid sources like family
nd reciprocal labour; and the remaining 50% is the farmer’s own
abour. In the 2010–2011 season the price per kg of cocoa beans
tood at US$ 2.23. Since the government provides chemical spray-
ng for crop protection throughout the cocoa belt, the farmer pays
nly for the cost of hired labour.
Suppose a farmer crops one hectare of cocoa. There are
hree types of farmers: those who own the land (owner–farmer),
enant–farmer, and caretakers. Each of them earns the same rev-
nue: 250 ×US$ 2.23 = US$ 557.50.
The accounting proﬁts - revenue minus explicit out-of-pocket
osts - depend on the type of farmer.
Owner–farmer. Since 40% of his labour requirement is hired (i.e.,
2 days), we ﬁnd for his accounting proﬁt (AP)  AP (owner)  = US$
57.50 − 32 × US$ 3.57 = US$ 443.26.
Tenant–farmer. He is always tied to an Abunu land use contract.
bunu is a land use system in which a piece of land is given to a
armer and crops are shared on a ﬁfty–ﬁfty basis between farmer
nd landowner. The farmer’s explicit costs include payment for
iring of labour and, under the Abunu land use contract, half of
is output as rent. Therefore, AP (tenant)  = US$ 557.50 − 32 × US$
.57 − 1/2 × US$ 557.50 = US$ 164.51.
Caretaker. He is always contracted under the Abusa land use con-
ract where he earns one third of the output. His explicit costs are
ven larger, since under the Abusa land use contract two-thirds of
he output is paid as rent, so AP (caretaker) = US$ 557.50 − 32 × US$
.57 − 2/3 × US$ 557.50 = US$ 71.59.
However, the relevant income yardstick is not accounting proﬁt
ut economic proﬁt, which also takes account of implicit costs.
mplicit costs are captured by the wage income a farmer could have
arned by working on someone else’s farm or in another form of
mployment. Since 50% of the farm labour requirement consists
f farmers’ own labour, each type of farmer has an implicit cost of
0 × US$ 3.57 = US$ 142.80. Moreover, an owner could also lease his
and, so he has an additional implicit cost of 1/2 × US$ 557.50 = US$
78.57 if he rented his land under the Abunu system, and 2/3 × US$
57.50 = US$ 371.67 under the Abusa system.
In sum, if we assume that farmers always have the opportunity
o hire themselves out or to lease their land, then an owner–farmer
arns an economic proﬁt of US$ 21.71 (443.26–142.80–278.75)
f he leases his land under the Abunu system or, in the
ase of the Abusa system, an economic loss of US$ 71.21
443.26–142.80–371.67). A tenant–farmer earns an economic
roﬁt of US$ 21.71 (164.51–142.80); whereas a caretaker always
akes an economic loss of US$ 71.21 (71.59–142.80).
The example illustrates the fragile basis of farmers’ economic
osition and helps explain why making quality-related invest-
ents would require stronger incentives to be provided to them.
lthough the assumptions in the example may  be oversimpliﬁed,
he example illustrates the fact that without adequate price and
on-price incentives most farmers, that is, tenants and caretakers,
re unable to carry out the recommended practices, even if they
ould know what these are.
This constraint arises from the ﬁnancial losses farmers appear
o be making because of the relatively low revenue compared with
ther uses of their labour and the high cost of renting land. Poor
nancial services for cocoa farmers, because of the perceived high
isks associated with lending to farmers, and because of lack of
lternative sources of income during off-season periods affect farm-
rs’ ﬁnancial position, contribute to the income problem.nal of Life Sciences 60– 63 (2012) 7– 14
Two other key issues can be mentioned that affect the ﬁnan-
cial position of farmers. First, during the interviews and focus
group discussions it emerged that the timing of the announce-
ment of producer prices varied from season to season and often
were announced too late to inform farmers’ production and mar-
keting decisions. The general schedule of events is as follows. Cocoa
purchases are halted in June each year. A Producer Price Review
Committee (PPRC) announces the new prices that will be paid at
the commencement of cocoa bean purchases between September
and October each year. Farmers begin harvesting by the end of July
and sometimes have to sell their cocoa beans at the prices of the
previous year between July and October because of delays in the
announcement of new prices. This seems on the face of it to con-
ﬁrm that timing is an issue that may  lead to a considerable loss of
income for farmers, particularly since up to this year the new prices
have always been higher than in the previous years.
Secondly, rent-seeking activities by competing LBCs also affect
farmers’ ﬁnancial position. An example is their adjustment of the
weighing scales in order to obtain more cocoa beans from farmers
at the going price. Some farmers and LBCs interviewed mentioned
that although there is the so-called ‘ofﬁcial Accra weight’, which is
the Producer Price Review Committee’s (PPRC’s) unit of 64 kg per
bag, the prevailing weight is the ‘village weight’ used by the LBCs,
which varies between 65 kg and 70 kg per bag. Farmers have not
been able to negotiate their way  out of this unfortunate position,
probably because they are weakly organized. The LBCs argue that
the extra revenue accrued from the adjusted scales covers the risk
they have to bear when they purchase cocoa beans of low quality
from farmers.
4. Discussion
4.1. Institutions and actor interactions
Problems related to commodity quality are often attributed
to information asymmetry [37–39]. The information asymmetry
problem is easier to understand when one analyses the interac-
tions among the three main categories of actors in the sector i.e.,
those who  ensure the movement of cocoa beans from the farm to
the chocolate manufacturer–farmers, LBCs and COCOBOD. Hueth
et al. [39] posit that when incentive problems affect the quality
of agricultural commodities, then input control, ﬁeld visits, quality
measurement, and general price increases are the best institutional
mechanisms for co-ordinating the interaction between actors in
order to ensure quality [40,41]. Two  interactions seem to be par-
ticularly important here: between COCOBOD and farmers, and
between the LBCs and farmers.
The relation between COCOBOD and farmers can be best
described as paternalistic. The farmers consider themselves to be
the recipients of policies, technologies and inputs from COCO-
BOD and to have minimal participation in the decision-making
processes. Because farmers do not supply cocoa beans directly to
COCOBOD, the latter relies solely on reciprocity, that is, by design-
ing a number of beneﬁcial policies in the hope that farmers will
respond by supplying quality cocoa beans.
COCOBOD regulates all the chemical inputs imported into the
country for use on cocoa farms even though sometimes unapproved
chemicals have found their way  to the market for farmers’ use. Also,
COCOBOD uses part of the export revenues from cocoa to carry
out mass-spraying of all cocoa farms at least twice per season. The
mass-spraying campaign has been expanded since the 2008–2009
season with the introduction of foliar liquid fertilizers in addition
to pesticides and fungicides. This helps to reduce the information
problem because the majority of cocoa farms are treated with the
right chemicals at least once a year. However, it does not effectively
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ackle the quality aspects of cocoa pests and diseases because it is
alendar-based and not need-based. It was observed during this
tudy that the mass-spraying campaign also faces such challenges
s fraudulent diversion of the approved chemicals, the inefﬁcient
pplication techniques used by spraying gangs, application sched-
les that do not follow COCOBOD recommendations, and political
nterference.
Price policy is used to co-ordinate the interactions between
OCOBOD and farmers. It is effective for the sector as a whole
ecause cocoa supply responds positively to prices. However, the
PRC, which is responsible for setting cocoa producer prices (their
ecommendation is then forwarded to the Cabinet for approval),
nds it difﬁcult to make the voices of the farmers heard even
hough farmers are represented on the PPRC [42]. The farmer rep-
esentatives interviewed indicated that they are sometimes not
dequately briefed about the methods used to determine prices.
ver the years, two modes have been adopted. Prior to the cocoa
ector reforms in the 1990s, the policy was to set the price at a
evel equivalent to the estimated cost of production plus a proﬁt
argin. Presently, price-setting is based on a calculated percent-
ge of the free on board (f.o.b) price that Ghana receives from
he export of cocoa beans. Even though the PPRC recommended
and the Cabinet accepted) an increase in the price paid to cocoa
armers from 23.3% of the f.o.b price in 1983–1984 to up to 73% in
008–2009, it is not known which of the two modes provides sufﬁ-
ient motivation to farmers to want to further enhance cocoa bean
uality.
Under the current price policy, the information problem in the
ocoa sector seems difﬁcult to solve. In principle, a combination
f testing and price differentiation could initiate a self-selection
rocess where some farmers would be discouraged from sup-
lying low-quality beans, and others encouraged to produce and
ell high-quality beans. From the perspective of COCOBOD, qual-
ty already is factored into the pricing formula since its licensed
uyers purchase only premium quality cocoa. Furthermore, the
wo quality grades sold from Ghana are marketable as premium
ocoa on the international market. Hence, COCOBOD does not
eem to have any incentive to introduce differentiated prices as
ong as they can be sure of obtaining a sufﬁcient volume of qual-
ty beans. On the other hand, the LBCs may  have an incentive
o differentiate prices in order to increase the volume of quality
eans they buy from farmers, yet the cocoa marketing rules do
ot give much room for the LBCs to implement such a price pol-
cy. This is because LBCs do not receive a differentiated price from
OCOBOD.
There are other policies introduced by COCOBOD that provide
ncentives to cocoa farmers to improve their production. These
nclude an input credit programme (the so-called hi-tech scheme),
 45% fertilizer subsidy, annual scholarship grants awarded to about
600 children of cocoa farmers and the staff of COCOBOD, and ﬂex-
ble house mortgage schemes.
These policies, however, do not help to reduce the information
symmetries in the sector. Also, the majority of farmers are not
ble to access these beneﬁts because they either are smallholders
r they are sharecroppers who do not own the cocoa farms they
rop. The house mortgage scheme, for instance, still is too expensive
or sharecroppers and, apart from the fact that only 40% of farm-
rs’ children beneﬁt from the scholarships, some of the criteria for
ccessing the cocoa scholarships do not favour smallholders’ chil-
ren. For example, the examination results of children attending
illage schools i.e., those attended by farmers’ children, are often
oo poor to meet the pass mark required to access cocoa scholar-
hips.
Information asymmetry is more persistent in the interaction
etween farmers and LBCs than between farmers and COCOBOD
ince farmers supply their beans straight to LBCs. Prior to thenal of Life Sciences 60– 63 (2012) 7– 14 13
reforms of the 1990s, only the Produce Buying Company, a sub-
sidiary of COCOBOD, purchased cocoa beans. While this monopoly
had some negative socio-economic effects, farmers’ cocoa beans
were closely inspected at the village-level and a premium was paid
for quality. This partly explains the high quality status Ghanaian
cocoa beans enjoyed in the years preceding the reforms. The intro-
duction of more LBCs after the reforms brought with it a weakening
of the village-level mechanism for bean quality checks and enforce-
ment. This has provided room for rent-seeking activities by LBCs
that in turn undermine the grounds for paying quality premiums.
Presently LBCs have little or no mechanisms for ensuring that
farmers stick to recommended practices. The fundamental concern
over the farmer–LBC interaction is that LBCs are becoming merely
proﬁt-seeking agents of COCOBOD. Since the rules regarding the
marketing of cocoa beans give the LBCs little room to indepen-
dently tackle the information problem, they themselves have not
taken action to remedy the situation.
4.2. Institutional gaps and opportunities for experimentation
The execution of a diagnostic study on the institutions governing
interactions in a public-interest sector like cocoa faces the problem
of acquiring adequate data. Moreover, it is difﬁcult to point out any
shortcomings while Ghana enjoys a high reputation for the export
of quality beans. Notwithstanding these difﬁculties, the study has
shown that COCOBOD’s policies have provided some incentives to
farmers to enhance quality but also that these policies only partly
reduce the information asymmetries among cocoa farmers, LBCs,
and COCOBOD. It has been demonstrated that this may  be the
real reason why some farmers shirk the responsibility of adopt-
ing the recommended production and post-harvest management
practices.
Farmers who do not stick to the recommended practices remain
undetected and unsanctioned: no mechanism nor procedure exists
to enforce their adoption. These gaps represent opportunities
for institutional change that could help reduce the information
problem and at the same time provide cocoa farmers a more remu-
nerative reward for their activities. The original entry point of
the CoS-SIS cocoa domain research was to sustain the quality of
cocoa bean by means of changes in the structure of incentives.
This study suggests that further research is warranted that takes
into account the potential inﬂuence of farmer organizations and
networks on member farmers’ production practices. The main sug-
gestion arising from this study is that the appropriate development
of self-selection mechanisms, such as quality testing coupled with
price premiums paid at farm gate, could overcome the negative
impact of the existing information asymmetries in the cocoa sec-
tor and hence is an option worth exploring as a policy experiment.
Another worthwhile institutional experiment would be to make
the cocoa price policy formulation process more transparent and
to increase the transparency of the relation between pricing and
quality. Exploration of the economic, social and quality impacts of
different modes of pricing would also provide useful insight into
price policy options for enhancing cocoa bean quality.
The institutional experiments suggested by the analysis in this
paper should be of interest to the cocoa Concertation and Innova-
tion Group. However, the higher level institutional changes would
require evidence and feedback from the farmer- and village-level
experiments. Experiments that provide differentiated incentive
prices for farmers (which might become part of our on-going (PhD)
research), could provide information about cost-effective strate-
gies for enhancing cocoa bean quality by raising standards right
from the beginning of the value chain. Such experiments would
provide insight into how farmers might respond, in terms of quality
and quantity, to the introduction of alternative pricing mechanisms
into the local cocoa market.
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. Conclusions
This paper reports the ﬁndings of a diagnostic study on quality
n the cocoa sector in Ghana, focusing on the institutional factors
hat act as a disincentive for farmers to enhance the quality of cocoa
eans. The concept of cocoa bean quality is complex, encompass-
ng socio-economic, physical, and bio-chemical aspects as well as
he process of cocoa production. Currently, because of the rela-
ive ease of observing physical characteristics, both domestic and
nternational markets emphasize physical quality.
The analysis highlights the fact that although Ghana exports
nly premium quality cocoa beans, the volume of high quality beans
ould be increased if farmers were motivated to enhance the qual-
ty of their harvested cocoa beans. At present, farmers sometimes
re unable or unwilling to invest resources into the recommended
arm practices because there are little or no incentives to do so.
The key explanation identiﬁed for the lack of incentives is that
he interaction among farmers, LBCs and COCOBOD is character-
zed by problems of information asymmetry. The lack of farm
onitoring and grading services, and the lack of strong farmer
rganizations, allow the information problem to persist. Further-
ore, our analysis shows that farmers face an income problem
ff-season that restricts the potential for investment of any kind,
nd have little knowledge of either the recommended farm prac-
ices or COCOBOD policies and standards with respect to quality.
The current policies of COCOBOD do not address adequately
he incentive problem. The policy gap presents an opportunity for
xperimenting at farmer- and higher levels that might lead to insti-
utional improvements through the value chain that would help
nhance and sustain cocoa bean quality and increase the reward
hat farmers receive.
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